PROOF
Two proofs. Do not mix them.
Laptop: attach the agent and fire a canary — unsafe tool JSON returns HTTP 403 (or WOULD_BLOCK in audit). Ubuntu Node: the same intent is a syscall warrant. Docker Desktop never shows EPERM.
A queued test is not a successful block. Kernel proof requires Aegis Node on Ubuntu 24.04.
YOUR FIRST PROOF
Test Aegis safely, then make the next step real.
- 01 TEST
Test Aegis safely
Send a non-production attack simulation to your connected Aegis control plane.
A safe simulation of an agent being asked to ignore its rules.
Results come from the connected Aegis control plane. A queued test is not a successful block.
- 02 REVIEW
See what Aegis caught
Load the available decision records, then share the same evidence with an auditor or teammate.
Evidence reflects records returned by your connected Aegis control plane; it does not manufacture a pass or a block.
- 03 CONNECT
Connect the first real agent
Start in audit mode, point one agent at Aegis, and enable enforcement only after the evidence looks right.
Protect my first agent Start with a protection planKernel-level proof requires Aegis Node on supported Linux. Other results depend on the controls connected to your Aegis control plane.
KERNEL (UBUNTU 24.04)
What the independent review actually found
Raw urllib returned 200 and hit the sink because it skipped a patched SDK constructor. At the kernel that bypass disappears — deny is errno 1 on undeclared /etc/passwd opens and off-ticket connects. Verifier notes (f_path_offset, BTF relocation, hypervisor isolation) belong here, not on the homepage.
- Kernel EPERM (errno 1) on undeclared path and socket
- 0 egress packets at the sealed hypervisor firewall in that film
- f_path_offset=152 — runtime BTF relocation on Linux 6.8
- +0.78 ms median userspace overhead (one external tester, home lab: 40 sidecar calls vs direct)
On Windows, watch this page and the work-order path. Do not expect syscall blocks on Docker Desktop WSL.
48-hour containment audit